Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 19 | Issue 1

Article 3

3-1-2004

After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must
Keep Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy
L. Darnell Weeden

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons
Recommended Citation
L. Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must Keep Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 BYU J. Pub. L.
161 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol19/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must Keep
Its Eyes on the Tainted Diversity Prize Legacy
L. Darnell Weeden*
In Grutter v. Bollinger,1 the United States Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether utilizing race as a factor in law student admissions by
the University of Michigan Law School (“Law School”) to advance
diversity is a constitutionally permissible compelling state interest under
its Bakke opinion.2 The highly regarded and prestigious Law School
made a commitment to achieve a diverse student body by considering
race among other factors in the admission process. The Law School
articulated a goal of admitting students from a variety of backgrounds
and experiences in order to promote an exchange of ideas and mutual
intellectual respect. The Law School’s diversity program highlighted an
applicant’s academic ability coupled with a flexible evaluation of the
applicant’s ability to expand the learning environment of other
individuals in the law school community and legal profession.3
Unfortunately, the day has not come when America has reached a
point of cultural and racial maturity in the context of higher education to
abandon the governmental use of race-based laws to benefit or burden an
individual. The Grutter opinion was a wake-up call for Americans that
the day to end race discrimination in higher education has not yet come.
After reading the Supreme Court’s critical statement, “We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary
to further the [diversity] interest approved today,”4 it should be
concluded that diversity based on racial discrimination should end now
and not after twenty-five years of racially flawed codependence. Because
*
Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law; Texas Southern University: B.A., J.D., University of
Mississippi. The author would like to thank Attorney Ahunanya Anga, Registrar, Thurgood Marshall
School of Law for her valuable comments concerning earlier drafts of this article, and Trung Chi
Tran and Simeon Coker, both Research Assistants at Thurgood Marshall School of Law Class of
2005 for their research help. The author would additionally like to thank the organizers of the 2003
Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference for allowing him to present some of his
ideas contained in this article as a work. This opportunity to present to a community of legal scholars
has provided the author with intellectual insight and consideration even though many participants at
the conference strongly disagreed with the author’s theory on some of the issues presented.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
4. Id. at 2347.
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race-based diversity policy promotes notions of racial superiority and
racial inferiority, a race-based diversity program is inherently flawed.
Part I of this article portrays the implication of race-based slavery for
the current race-based diversity debate in higher education. Part II of this
article describes the racially perceptive setting and procedural history of
the issues presented in Grutter and puts forward the reasoning of the
majority opinion. Part III raises the question of whether Grutter’s
treatment of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke as binding precedent for
diversity that discriminates on the basis of race is intellectual conjecture
not supported by prior decisions of the Court. Part IV addresses whether
the Supreme Court’s heightened judicial scrutiny applies to disfavored
whites as individuals. Part V discusses whether the Supreme Court’s
holding in Grutter has a negative impact on African-Americans because
the opinion may have sent a message that racial diversity equals
accommodating racial inferiority. Part VI analyzes the implication of
race-neutral college legacy preferences for family members in the
context of affirmative action. Part VII contends that the whites-only
scholarship is an unfortunate foreseeable consequence of race exclusive
scholarships for other racial groups. Part VIII notes the elusive search for
an equitable public policy that narrows the education achievement gaps
between historically disadvantaged students and middle class nonminority students.
I. THE IMPLICATION OF RACE-BASED SLAVERY FOR THE CURRENT
RACE-BASED DIVERSITY DEBATE IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Although diversity in higher education is important, the use of raceconscious discriminatory laws in the United States should not be utilized
because neither the local, state, or federal government is sensitive enough
to the goals of diversity to fairly use the race card. The real intellectual
diversity issue is whether historical race-based slavery and sequential
racial discrimination for more than 130 years have a continuing impact
on higher education opportunities for African-Americans. In a recent
interview, Professor Ronald Ferguson of Harvard, and an AfricanAmerican parent, stated that the racial gap in academic achievement
between blacks and whites in affluent upper middle class integrated
suburbs exists because of economics, and “the human damage from two
centuries of slavery plus legalized segregation that persisted until the
mid-1960’s will simply not be undone in a generation, not even in
suburbia.”5
5. Michael Winerip, In the Affluent Suburbs, an Invisible Race Gap, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/04/education/04EDUC.html?ex=1370145600&
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Race-based diversity preferences in higher education are not
adequate compensation for historical race-based slavery, and laws that
discriminated against African-Americans because of their race and racebased preferences are too politically and racially sensitive to be assigned
to government officials or the American public. All Americans
committed to diversity in higher education must thoughtfully monitor the
diversity blueprint to determine whether educational diversity is best
achieved through a race-conscious admission method or by using an
approach that is free of racial discrimination. The Supreme Court in
Grutter6 has delayed the day when American leaders must apologize to
African-Americans for America’s race-based pro-slavery history7 and
current social policies of racial stereotyping and instead embark on a
diversity policy without racial discrimination designed to serve the best
interest of the descendents of its former African-American slaves. Less
than three weeks after the decision in Grutter, during a tour of Africa,
President George W. Bush may have taken an unintended small step
toward an official apology for slavery by condemning the American
slave trade as “one of the greatest crimes in history.”8
President Bush’s recongition of black Americans’ contiuning raw
wound from the continuing vestiges of slavery is rare among white
Americans.9 By reciting the particulars of America’s shameful history of
en=e75e089899966773&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND. Winerip reports:
[Ferguson’s] research shows that in the years before school, white parents spend more
time reading to their children, while blacks devote more to song and play – the start of the
gap. Professor Ferguson writes, “As a black parent, I acknowledge there might be
differences in what we do with our preschool children that would put them on a more
equal footing with whites on the first day of kindergarten.”
Id.
6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
7. See id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., concurring). “[I]t was only 25 years before Bakke
that this Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional, a declaration that, after
prolonged resistance, yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of
centuries of slavery.” Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf. Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
8. Tamara Lipper, Alternative Motive, Maybe?, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2003, available at
2003 WL 8639475. Lipper reports:
On his whirlwind tour of Africa last week, President George W. Bush pledged $15 billion
to fight AIDS, denounced the American slave trade as “one of the greatest crimes in
history,” toured a wildlife park, met with African leaders and publicly weighed sending
troops to help suffering Liberians. In the words of one GOP official, the trip was intended
to “catch people’s attention,” reminding them that the war in Iraq hasn’t diminished
Bush’s desire to be seen as a compassionate conservative. With next year’s elections
approaching, Bush aides were especially eager to use the trip to improve his standing
with African-American voters, who have a “perception problem with the Republican
Party,” says one official. (Two still sore points: the Trent Lott debacle and the president’s
own stand against affirmative action).
Id.
9. Id.
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slavery, President Bush made the story of America’s African
slaves more widely known.10 “Between 1 million and 2 million captives
were shipped out to the New World from the Senegambian region, of
which Goree’s door of no return was the main point of embarkation.
Conservative estimates put the total numbers exiled from their African
homeland between 10 million and 12 million.”11 A race sensitive
diversity essay question for all applicants to America’s elite colleges may
ask all potential students to discuss whether the American slavery issue
has impacted their personal view on diversity in higher education.
President Bush’s speech on slavery during the summer of 2003 at
Goree Island in Senegal probably surprised a number of Americans.12
College applicants may also be challenged to explore whether
historical racial slavery has a continuing economic13 impact on one’s
ability to receive an effective education in America today.14 “To
understand racism and its deep-seated roots in American society, one
must have a knowledge and understanding of history.”15

10. Id.
11. Id. (“Before the massive European immigration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
more Africans than Europeans entered the Americas. By the time the American Civil War broke out
in 1861, the largest enslaved population in the world lived in the United States.”)
12. Neil Irvin Parker, Bush at Goree: Words don’t Heal Slavery’s Wound, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, July 13, 2003, Outlook Section 1, available at 2003 WL 57427708.
13. Id. Mr. Parker explains that:
Bush mentioned the trauma of transportation and sale. He listed the main economic
handicaps related to enslavement: Unpaid labor, restrictions on marriage and, therefore,
on inheritance, no property, no accumulation of wealth, and virtually no education meant
black people were penniless at emancipation.
When blacks became U.S. citizens in the 1860s, they started at economic ground
zero. For three or four subsequent generations, racial discrimination and exclusion from
public life kept black people the poorest people in the nation. The era of legal segregation
ended . . . but the enduring lack of wealth keeps black people the poorest in the nation.
Id.
14. Id. Mr. Parker states that:
Perhaps the power of that chilling place awakened Bush to the viciousness of the
institution that created the American political economy. Most of the founding fathers
were slave owners, including Benjamin Franklin. And the power of slavery shaped the
compromises of the constitutional convention, the United States Constitution and the first
half of the 19th century. Slavery, as Bush noted, was no little thing.
Echoing slave owner Thomas Jefferson, Bush tallied up the usually forgotten costs
of slavery to the owners: “Years of unpunished brutality and bullying and rape produced
a dullness and hardness of conscience. Christian men and women became blind to the
clearest commands of their faith and added hypocrisy to injustice.”
Id.
15. Jeffrey J. Wallace, Ideology vs. Reality: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in a Color Blind
Society, 36 AKRON L. REV. 693, 697 (2003). Wallace states:
George Santanya [sic] once wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it.” An understanding of the past is critical in interpreting the present, with the
hope of resolving problems in the future. There is a legacy in America of anti-Black
sentiment, White superiority, and Black inferiority. There is a stigma of racism and a

161]

TAINTED DIVERSITY PRIZE

165

Each applicant should be given an opportunity to discuss diverse
perspectives on the issue of the relationship of slavery to diversity in
higher education in order to promote the intellectual dexterity
appropriate for attendance at one of America’s elite colleges or
universities. To truly promote the intellectual diversity and historical
perspective, all applicants seeking admissions to a school with a racebased diversity admission plan might consider whether they agree with
one commentator’s view that the Declaration of Independence refused to
condemn African-American slavery because the leaders of the American
Revolution supported America’s anti-black attitude.16 “This anti-Black
sentiment, based on historical memory, stereotypes, and blatant racism
continues to plague our society and prevents us from honestly and openly
dealing with race in America today.”17 If Grutter18 is truly about
engaging in a robust exchange of ideas, it is appropriate that elite
colleges engage in a robust debate about whether it is fair to characterize
America as having either an anti-black or pro-white way of thinking
about racial diversity in higher education. Diversity based on racial
discrimination negatively impacts America’s effort to become a society
free of racial discrimination.
Justice O’Connor, the author of the Grutter opinion, was appointed
to the Supreme Court “through affirmative action.”19 According to some
commentators, Justice O’Connor returned the affirmative action favor in
Grutter by taking a leadership role “in the most important affirmativeaction case in decades.”20 Justice O’Connor’s vote to support the Law
School’s race-based diversity plan is generally regarded as the decisive
tiebreaker.21 It is generally believed that the Supreme Court’s decision in
the Law School “affirmative-action case was squarely in line with the
opinions of most editorial writers and business and academic leaders.”22

failure to learn from the past, which prevents the achievement of true equality. If we as a
nation are going to live up to our values of freedom, equality, and social justice, then we
must open our minds and our hearts to accept the truth of our convictions and be true to
our values and ideals.
Id.
16. Id. at 697-98.
17. Id. at 699.
18. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
19. Evan Thomas, Stuart Taylor Jr., Debra Rosenberg & Eleanor Clift, Center Court; She
Helped America Seek a Middle Ground on the Thorny Subject of Race. Sandra Day O’Connor’s
Brand of Justice, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8639381.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Newsweek reported that:
Corporations and universities flooded the court with briefs arguing that affirmative action
has been a success at providing diversity on campus and in the workplace. Nonetheless,
O’Connor’s reasoning was a little slippery or muddy, as several columnists, like Slate’s

166

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 19

However, before the proverbial ink was dry on the landmark Grutter
decision, both opponents and supporters of racial preferences in higher
education were preparing for the next battle over race-based affirmative
action in higher education.23
During July 2003, approximately fifty college presidents met at
Harvard to honor the Supreme Court’s decision supporting race-based
diversity in higher education.24 However, the celebration honoring the
Grutter decision was guarded as officials analyzed how to address the
next wave of litigation and constitutional referendums.25 In the same
month, Ward Connerly, an African-American, started a ballot initiative
in Michigan to make racial preferences in admissions illegal under state
law.26 Connerly used the ballot initiative approach in California and
Washington to outlaw race-based admissions in higher education.27
Because diversity without racial discrimination in higher education is an
idea whose time has come, this article will attempt to give thoughtful
consideration to the issue of race-based affirmative action versus
affirmative action free of racial discrimination in higher education in a
post-Grutter world.
II. THE RACIALLY PERCEPTIVE SETTING AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF
GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
The Michigan Law School diversity policy mandated admissions
representatives to review each applicant’s file. The individual assessment
of the applicant’s file included consideration of a personal statement,
letters of recommendation, and an essay that addressed how the applicant
would add to the existing diversity at the Law School.28 In appraising an
Michael Kinsley, pointed out. (An angry Clarence Thomas, the court’s black
conservative, castigated O’Connor for following the “faddish slogans” of the
“cognoscenti.”)
Id.
23. Pat Wingert & Debra Rosenberg, Just the Beginning, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 8639524.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Wingert and Rosenberg reported that:
The Center for Equal Opportunity has filed three complaints with the Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights, arguing that programs designed to boost minority
enrollment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, St. Louis University and
Virginia Tech violate the law. At the same time, it has written letters to some 30 other
schools, threatening to file more complaints if the schools don’t make changes in “race
exclusive” scholarship and out-reach programs—a strategy that could serve as a model
for future attacks.
Id.
28. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332.
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applicant’s file, admissions representatives looked at the applicant’s
undergraduate grade point average (“GPA”) and Law School Admissions
Test (“LSAT”) score because they serve as significant forecasters of
academic success in law school.29 The Law School’s race-conscious
diversity plan emphasized that “no applicant should be admitted unless
we expect that applicant to do well enough to graduate with no serious
academic problems.”30 The flexible diversity admission plan declared
that having the highest possible score would not guarantee admission to
the Law School. On the other hand, a low score did not automatically
disqualify an applicant under the diversity plan because the soft,
intangible, less-than-objective variables may foretell that an applicant is
a strong candidate to “contribut[e] to the intellectual and social life of the
institution.”31
To its credit, the Law School’s diversity plan is based on the broad
concept of educational enrichment. To achieve this goal, the Law School
does not limit the diversity contribution entitled to substantial weight in
its admission procedure to racial and ethnic status alone as the plan
includes other factors for diversity admissions.32 The Law School asserts
in unequivocal terms its dedication to racial and ethnic diversity with
particular attention given to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic,
and Native American students because of their long history of being
victims of racial and ethnic discrimination.33 The Law School believes
that without a race-conscious component in its diversity plan AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, and Native Americans would not be present in its
student body in meaningful numbers.34
In 1996, Barbara Grutter, a white female citizen of Michigan with a
3.8 grade point average and an LSAT score of 161 was denied admission
to the Law School.35 In December 1997, Grutter filed a reverse
discrimination lawsuit in federal district court against the Law School
and other University of Michigan officials alleging that the Law School
intentionally discriminated against her because she was a member of the
white race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition
against racial discrimination. Grutter also contended in the lawsuit that
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196436 and 42 U.S.C. § 198137

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004) provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

168

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 19

prohibit the Law School’s race-conscious factors.38 Grutter asserted that
she was denied admission because the Law School’s use of race as a
predominant factor benefited specific preferred racial minority group
candidates at the expense of white candidates with similar credentials of
those candidates from minority racial groups.39
The district court conducted a bench trial concerning the degree to
which race was a factor in the Law School’s admission process.40 The
district court also analyzed whether the Law School’s use of race in its
admission process constituted an illegal race-based double standard.41
Throughout the fifteen-day bench trial the litigants presented a wide
range of evidence regarding how the Law School made use of race in its
admissions process.42 In an effort to measure the degree to which the
Law School actually used race in the admission process, Grutter’s expert
Dr. Kinley Larntz evaluated the Law School’s “admissions grids” for
1995-2000.43 Dr. Larntz concluded that race was not the predominant
factor in the Law School’s admissions process.44 Following Dr. Larntz’s
concession, it was constitutionally plausible for the court in following the
Supreme Court’s rationale used in the majority-minority congressional
district cases to conclude that race may be used as a factor in
governmental decision making in certain limited circumstances where
race is not the predominant motivating factor.45
Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the Law School’s expert, stated during the
trial that removing race as a motivating factor in the Law School’s
admission process would have an extremely harmful impact on diversity
admissions.46 According to Dr. Raudenbush, a race-neutral admissions
process would have reduced the number of race-based diversity
applicants admitted from thirty-five percent to ten percent in 2000.47 Dr.
Raudenbush testified that under a race-neutral plan, the underrepresented
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2004) states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
38. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332.
39. Id. at 2332-33.
40. Id. at 2333.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2334.
44. Id.
45. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
46. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2334.
47. Id.
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minority students would have constituted only four percent of the
entering class in 2000 as opposed to the 14.5 percent who were actually
admitted.48 At the conclusion of the trial, the federal district court held
that the Law School’s utilization of race as a factor in its admission
process was illegal under the strict scrutiny standard.49 The district court
ruled that the Law School’s interest in creating and maintaining student
diversity was not compelling because racial diversity was not a
compelling interest under the rationale of Bakke.50 The district court also
stated that even if racial diversity in higher education were a compelling
interest, the Law School’s use of race as a factor to advance that interest
was not constitutionally permissible because it was not narrowly
tailored.51 The district court agreed to Grutter’s demand for declaratory
relief and prohibited the Law School from considering race as a factor in
its admission process.52
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the injunction pending an
appeal.53 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, set aside
the injunction, and held that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke created
racial diversity as a valid compelling state interest.54 The court also ruled
that the Law School’s treatment of race was narrowly tailored for the
reason that race was simply a “potential ‘plus’ factor” and because the
Law School’s diversity admission process was “virtually identical” to the
Harvard diversity admission process portrayed favorably by Justice
Powell.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari56 to decide the disputed
issue of whether diversity is a compelling enough interest to justify a
narrowly tailored treatment of race in selecting applicants for admission
to public universities.57

48. Id.
49. Id. at 2335.
50. Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
51. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335.
57. Id. (“Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (Hopwood I) (holding that
diversity is not a compelling state interest), with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188
(9th Cir.2000) (holding that it is).”).
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III. WHETHER GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER’S TREATMENT OF JUSTICE
POWELL’S OPINION IN BAKKE AS BINDING PRECEDENT FOR DIVERSITY
THAT DISCRIMINATES ON THE BASIS OF RACE IS INTELLECTUAL
CONJECTURE NOT SUPPORTED BY PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COURT
According to Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court previously
attended to the issue of race-conscious admissions in public higher
education twenty-five years earlier in the landmark Bakke decision.58
Bakke involved a racial set-aside admissions program that allotted
sixteen out of one hundred places in a medical school class for
individuals from specified minority groups.59 Justice Powell supported
the state court’s ruling invalidating the set-aside program, but he did not
affirm the state court’s injunction prohibiting the use of race in the
admission process.60 The Supreme Court in Bakke held that a “State has a
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin.”61 In Bakke, the Court overruled the component of the state
court’s judgment that forbade the university from using race as a factor
for any applicant.62 Because Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke
announced the fractured ruling of the Court, his opinion has served as the
benchmark for constitutional analysis of permissible race-conscious
admissions policies.63
The Court in Grutter v. Bollinger discussed the Powell opinion in
detail and treated his opinion in Bakke as if it were the opinion of the
Court, not because of any binding legal precedent, but because elite
colleges had relied on Justice Powell’s opinion in adopting their diversity
policies.64 The Supreme Court acknowledged in a classic understatement
that its fractured decision in Bakke created a circumstance where the
lower courts made a great effort to determine whether Justice Powell’s
racial diversity rationale articulated in Bakke, without support from any
other Justice, was binding precedent under the holding in Marks.65 In
Marks, the Supreme Court stated “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2335-36.
Id. at 2336 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2337 (citations omitted).
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grounds.”66
The Supreme Court avoided its responsibility to decide in Grutter
whether Justice Powell met the Marks test because the test is hard to
apply to the issue of racial diversity in higher education.67 The Court’s
refusal to decide whether Justice Powell’s racial diversity rationale is
binding Supreme Court precedent under Marks creates the impression
that the Court was predisposed to reach a specific result on race-based
diversity in higher education without giving adequate consideration to
the natural and logical legal consequence of applying Marks to the issues
presented in Grutter. The Supreme Court’s treatment of the Marks test in
Grutter left unresolved the question about the value of the test as legal
precedent in future cases involving race-based diversity.68
Although Marks may be binding precedent in other areas of the law,
the Court’s decision in Grutter has implicitly created an exception to the
Marks fractured opinion rationale in cases involving an issue of racial
diversity in higher education. The Court in Grutter could have limited
the Marks splintered opinion narrowest ground rationale to those cases,
like Marks, where all the federal appellate courts are in agreement that a
plurality opinion represents the holding of the United States Supreme
Court without extending the Marks inquiry to a logical extreme.69
Although the Supreme Court refused to decide whether Justice Powell’s
opinion supporting racial diversity as a compelling interest in higher
education is binding under Marks, one commentator concluded that the
Ninth Circuit got it right and that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke is
binding precedent under Marks.70
66. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). “Three Justices agreed with the
prevailing opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, consented on
more extensive grounds in reversing the judgment below.” Id. at 193. Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Douglas repeated their well-known view that the First Amendment grants an absolute shield
against governmental action designed to restrain obscenity. Mr. Justice Stewart also acquiesced in
the judgment because he believed that only “hardcore pornography” may be censored. In Marks, the
Supreme Court apparently concluded that the opinion of the Memoirs plurality represented the
holding of the Court and supplied the governing standards because every Court of Appeals that has
adjudicated the question between Memoirs and Miller properly concluded that Memoirs was
controlling precedent. Under the Memoirs standard, provocative words and pictures were deemed to
be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution demonstrated that they were “utterly without
redeeming social value.” Id. at 193-94.
67. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337 (citations omitted).
68. Id. (citation omitted).
69. Marks, 430 U.S. at 194.
70. Joelle A. Marty, Comment, Affirmative Action In Higher Education: Federal Circuit
Court Split Over Bakke’s Diversity Rationale, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 505, 528 (2003). Marty states:
Applying Marks v. United States, Justice Powell’s decision is binding precedent because
it represents the narrowest grounds upon which Bakke could rest. That is, Justice
Powell’s ‘plus factor’ approach rests on more narrow grounds than a broad race-based
possibility. Therefore, under Supreme Court precedent, Justice Powell’s opinion controls,
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY APPLIES
TO DISFAVORED WHITES AS INDIVIDUALS
In the context of racial diversity and higher education, the Supreme
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger71 by necessary implication extended its
heightened judicial scrutiny rationale of footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.72 to disfavored white individuals that are not
members of an insular and discrete minority.73 According to Professors
Farber and Frickey, under the traditional understanding of Justice Stone’s
well-known footnote four, strict judicial scrutiny was needed to protect
insular and discrete racial minorities because of their lack of voice in the
political process.74 While it is unpersuasive that Carolene Products did
not properly conclude in footnote four that racial minorities were in need
of judicial intervention to protect them from a racially hostile political
process,75 footnote four of Carolene Products is best understood as
protecting every individual from racial discrimination by the state in the

irrespective of the Brennan Group’s failure to join the portion of Justice Powell’s opinion
that discussed diversity.
Id. (citing Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2000)).
71. 123 S. Ct. at 2333.
72. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). (“[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”)
73. Id.
74. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 686 (1991)
(citations omitted).
75. Id. at 687. Farber and Frickey also state:
Third, by focusing on political powerlessness, the conventional rationale can lead to more
“searching judicial inquiry” whenever positive political theory suggests that some group
is systematically disadvantaged in the political process. The theory has thus been subject
to Justice Scalia’s ironic invocation of it, not as a shield protecting racial minorities
against discrimination, but as a sword against affirmative action measures. If Justice
Scalia is right, Carolene Products is defunct as a justification for protecting racial
minorities, whom he characterizes as organized groups that politicians are eager to
please. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s argument flips Carolene Products completely: it is the
members of the majority who are politically powerless and in need of judicial protection.
Justice Scalia’s argument finds apparent support in an influential article by a highly
unlikely ideological bedfellow, Bruce Ackerman. Drawing on the writings of public
choice theorists, Ackerman argued that Carolene Products was wrong in suggesting that
discrete minorities need special protection from the political process; instead, it is diffuse,
large groups whose interests are likely to be underrepresented. Ackerman did not seem to
have had affirmative action in mind, but his theory fits Justice Scalia’s assertions well,
and Ackerman’s critique may have the unintended results of justifying a more relaxed
judicial approach to discrimination against racial minorities and supporting Justice
Scalia’s stance toward affirmative action.
Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted).
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absence of a compelling justification.76 As a result of not restricting
suspect racial classifications to insular and discrete minorities, the
Supreme Court has granted people of all races strict scrutiny equal
protection.77
The Supreme Court’s holding in Grutter78 rejected the argument that
under Carolene Products’79 more exacting judicial scrutiny standards,
the State of Michigan did not have to demonstrate a “compelling interest
to justify [its] use of race in the admissions process.”80 In Grutter, the
Supreme Court stated, “[t]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s view that
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the
use of race in university admissions.”81 In 1991, Professors Farber and
Frickey predicted that the future of race-based affirmative action or racial
diversity could be decided by the role eventually assigned to the
Carolene Products suspected category rationale.82 Professors Farber and
Frickey believed Carolene Products promised groups traditionally
“excluded from full membership in the political community will receive
an inviting reception from the judiciary” to protect their interest.83 One of
the most fascinating aspects of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter
resides in her bold declaration that the rationale for racial diversity in
higher education is to promote higher education’s interest in a robust
exchange of intellectual ideas, and not to correct any historical
educational or social deficits of traditionally excluded insular and
discrete minorities.84
76. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 211-23 (1995).
77. See id.; see also L. Darnell Weeden, How to Establish Flying the Confederate Flag with
the State as Sponsor Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 34 AKRON L. REV. 521 (2001).
78. 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
79. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
80. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2333.
81. Id. at 2337.
82. Farber & Frickey, supra note 74, at 718.
83. Id. at 726.
84. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336. Justice O’Connor states:
In Justice Powell’s view, when governmental decisions “touch upon an individual’s race
or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked
to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”
Id., at 299, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Under this exacting standard, only one of the interests asserted
by the university survived Justice Powell’s scrutiny.
First, Justice Powell rejected an interest in “‘reducing the historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession’” as
an unlawful interest in racial balancing. Id., at 306-307, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Second, Justice
Powell rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimination because such measures
would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties “who bear no
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are
thought to have suffered.” Id., at 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Third, Justice Powell rejected an
interest in “increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities
currently underserved,” concluding that even if such an interest could be compelling in
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Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter85 that Justice Powell’s
support for racial diversity in higher education twenty-five years ago in
Bakke86 was intended to serve the interest of the predominantly white
university’s interest in intellectual diversity is consistent with Professor
Derrick Bell’s87 assertion that racial equality for African-Americans,
whether it is called diversity or affirmative action, will only be attained
when racial equality serves an overriding interest of whites. Under
Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory88 African-Americans
interest in achieving racial diversity has no independent value separate
from the interest of white elites.89
In a recent critique of the Supreme Court’s Grutter opinion,
Professor Bell maintains that the Grutter opinion is a “definitive
example” of his “I-C interest convergence theory.”90 Professor Bell
asserts his rationale for arguing that Grutter is a prime example of his
interest convergence theory is based on Justice O’Connor’s historical and
rather rigid opposition to race-based affirmative action in the economic
some circumstances the program under review was not “geared to promote that goal.” Id.,
at 306, 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733.
Justice Powell approved the university’s use of race to further only one interest:
“the attainment of a diverse student body.” Id., at 311, 98 S. Ct. 2733. With the important
proviso that “constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be
disregarded,” Justice Powell grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that “long
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.” Id., at 312, 314, 98 S. Ct.
2733.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
87. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980). Professor Bell states:
What accounted, then, for the sudden shift in 1954 away from the separate but equal
doctrine and towards a commitment to desegregation?
. . . [T]he decision in Brown to break with the Court’s long-held position on these
issues cannot be understood without some consideration of the decision’s value to whites,
not simply those concerned about the immorality of racial inequality, but also those
whites in policymaking positions able to see the economic and political advances at home
and abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation . . . . [T]he decision helped to
provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the
hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples.
Id.
88. Id. at 523. Professor Bell explains that:
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, this
principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.
However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy
providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the
superior societal status of middle and upper class whites.
Id.
89. Id.
90. Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003).
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arena of government contracts and public sector employment.91 Justice
O’Connor, according to Professor Bell, has generally disapproved of
race-based affirmative action when she believes the interests of whites
will be harmed in the areas of employment and government contracts.92
Professor Bell believes that Justice O’Connor only supported race-based
diversity in legal education because O’Connor apparently believes that
race-based diversity is a benefit and not a burden to whites.93 It is
Professor Bell’s opinion that under the Court’s holding in Grutter, blacks
and Hispanics are the fortuitous beneficiaries of a Court opinion
designed to benefit members of the nonminority elite.94 “When she
perceived in the Michigan Law School’s admission program an
affirmative action plan that minimizes the importance of race while
offering maximum protection to whites and those aspects of society with
which she identifies, she supported it.”95 Professor Bell believes that
Justice O’Connor supported diversity in Grutter because diversity is an
expedient means for admitting predominantly white children of wealth
and privilege while admitting a critical mass of selected minorities.96 If
white children of privilege and wealth admitted to elite schools are
generally required to have higher grades and LSAT scores than AfricanAmericans and Hispanics, the Court in Grutter has reinvented a new age
de facto separate but unequal doctrine in a poorly camouflaged effort to
hide what Professor Bell97 correctly describes as an elite class-based bias
in favor of the children of wealth and privilege.
Some commentators conclude that Grutter will have little impact on
the average African-American because only a small number of AfricanAmericans apply to selective colleges like the University of Michigan.98
It is suggested by some that Grutter was “concerned with creating more
black leaders by opening places for them in elite schools.”99 One may ask
what interest of the white upper class and middle classes could be served
by assuring that a critical mass of black leaders attends elite schools. One
plausible answer may be that many racial minorities who attend elite
schools tend to share the race-based elite focus of promoting racial
diversity as a symbol of racial progress without providing any
meaningful solutions to the persistent problem of economic and social
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1625-26.
Id. at 1626.
Id.
Id. at 1625.
Id.
Id. at 1632.
Id.
Thomas, Taylor, Rosenberg & Clift, supra note 19.
Id.
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disparity between African-Americans and whites.100 What makes the
huge investment of ingenuity and resources in the defense of Michigan’s
racial preferences disappointing is that the investment is grotesquely
disproportionate to any good it will do the African-American
community. But by the logic of the diversity rationale for preferences,
doing good for African-Americans is an afterthought.101
The cruel constitutional incongruity of the Grutter rationale is that
the decision is intended to impose a racially discriminatory hardship on
specific white individuals without really benefiting rank-and-file
African-Americans as a group, while unnecessarily prolonging future
litigation about race-based affirmative action in college admissions.102
100. George F. Will, Race-norming in Michigan; At Issue is the Racial Goal of Overthrowing
a Core Principle of Our Open Society – that Rights Inhere in Individuals, not Groups, NEWSWEEK,
June 23, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8639237. Will states:
Michigan’s supposed solicitude for minorities is an aspect of a national scandal.
Nationwide, 45 percent of African-American young people have their life chances
irrevocably blighted by never receiving high-school diplomas. In 2000 only 2 percent of
Michigan’s African-American eighth graders registered as “proficient” on the National
Assessment of Educational Progress math test. Five percent is the national average for
African-American eighth graders. For whites, the average is 34 percent proficient.
Yet what are the nation’s educational and opinion-forming elites obsessing about?
The defense of Michigan’s racial preferences.
Racial preferences for diversity pur-poses [sic] matter only at selective colleges, the
minority of four-year institutions that do not have, essentially, open admissions – open to
any high-school graduate and, in many cases, nongraduates. Such preferences matter
greatly only at highly selective institutions – those that receive at least twice as many
applications as they accept. There are fewer than 100 such institutions.
. . . The real purpose of socially engineered diversity is to somehow – there is scant
evidence as to just how this supposedly works – improve the educational experience for
all students attending elite institutions. Which means diversity preferences are intended
primarily for the benefit of nonminorities.
The preferred minorities – mainly African-Americans but also Hispanics – are
being used as seasoning ingredients for elite institutions. These institutions do not dwell
on certain amply documented and discomforting facts. As Taylor notes, the preferred
minorities have high failure and dropout rates and cluster disproportionately in the
bottom quarter of their classes. And of those who try to use their degrees from elite
institutions as passports to elite professional schools, most again are admitted on the basis
of schools’ racial double standards, and “shockingly high percentages” of preferentially
admitted students “end up flunking their medical boards and bar exams.”
Id.; see also, Michelle A. Whitham, Defining the Job: Understanding Job Descriptions, 1 DRAFTING
EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS HANDBOOK SUPPLEMENT § 7.5 (Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, Inc., 2002). Race norming, or “within-group scoring,” is the practice of
adjusting employment test scores so that a minority test taker’s score is compared to other test takers
of the same race, not to the general population of all test takers. Race norming is the only type of
conduct the 1991 Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits. This prohibition reflects the growing
national debate over affirmative action in general, and racial preferences and reverse discrimination
in particular. Id.
101. Will, supra note 100.
102. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (with whom
Thomas, J. joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Unlike a clear constitutional holding
that racial preferences in state educational institutions are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are OK, today’s
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Justice Scalia does an excellent job in identifying some of the
constitutional issues that will be litigated in the future because of the
inherently flawed Supreme Court race-based constitutional analysis used
in Grutter to justify reverse race-based discrimination.103 Justice Scalia
states that the Grutter future litigation roadmap will, at a minimum,
include the following six issues:104 (1) whether the race-based diversity
discrimination actually evaluates the individual predominately on the
merits or is the individual being evaluated under the separate but unequal
admission track for racial minority students who fall below the normal
admission criteria required of whites as a group;105 (2) whether the racebased discriminatory diversity purpose of obtaining a critical mass of
minority race students is a in fact an unconstitutional quota system
because race is actually the predominant factor in identifying the critical
mass of benefited racial minorities;106 (3) whether the race-based
diversity discrimination is a cause in fact of any traditional educational
benefits;107 (4) whether a university or college is truly committed to the
race-based discriminatory diversity approved by the Court in Grutter
(Justice Scalia has appropriately concluded that a university
accommodating reverse self imposed racial segregation by minority race
students with their “minority-only” activities as not being true to the
principle of multiculturalism and racial diversity);108 (5) whether the
college’s discriminatory racial diversity preference is in compliance with
the mystical critical minority racial mass concept identified in Grutter;109
and (6) whether a college’s race-based diversity discrimination will make
it liable to minority groups that are “intentionally short changed in the
institution’s composition of its generic minority ‘critical mass.’”110
No one should be surprised that the opinion in Grutter will generate
a great deal of future litigation because there are Americans who have
the belief that the government should never discriminate on the basis of
Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the
litigation.” Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2349-50.
105. Id. at 2349.
106. Id.
107. It is important to note that the educational benefits issue was not contested in Grutter.
108. Id. at 2349-50. Scalia states:
Tempting targets, one would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of tribalism and
racial segregation on their campuses—through minority-only student organizations,
separate minority housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even separate
minority-only graduation ceremonies.
Id.
109. Id. at 2350.
110. Id.
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race.111 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s conclusion that “[t]he
Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race,
and state-provided education is no exception,”112 is also incorrect
because the Supreme Court has consistently allowed the government to
discriminate on the basis of race for compelling reasons.113 However, if
the Court were to treat race as the forbidden governmental
classification114 the government would be prohibited from ever treating
any group or individual differently because of race. One must remember
that in 1944 after adopting its so called very rigid strict scrutiny standard
for race-based classification in Korematsu,115 the Supreme Court gave its
approval to Congress’s decision to detain Japanese-Americans because
of their race. While dissenting in Korematsu, Justice Murphy properly
described the federal government’s denial of civil rights to JapaneseAmericans as racist.116 When America is at war or facing a serious
national problem, the only constitutional rule that will save an individual
or a group from state-approved racial discrimination is a law that
unequivocally prohibits any governmental entity from treating a person
differently because of his or her race.117
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IN GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER HAS A
NEGATIVE IMPACT ON AFRICAN-AMERICANS BECAUSE THE OPINION
MAY HAVE SENT A MESSAGE THAT RACIAL DIVERSITY EQUALS
ACCOMMODATING RACIAL INFERIORITY
Regardless of whether one agrees with Professor Bell’s118 theory that

111. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 354 (1949).
112. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350. (Scalia , J., dissenting, with whom Thomas, J. joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) (holding that any law
classifying people based on race is subject to the compelling interest and strict scrutiny requirement
despite the fact that the law is intended to help, rather than harm, minorities); see Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (In Wygant, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion represented the
rationale of a majority of the Court in concluding that providing minority role models for students
because of societal discrimination was not a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny
standard); see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HORNBOOK NO.
639 (6th ed. West 2000) (stating that in a strict scrutiny review, “the Court will not uphold [a
government] classification unless the Justices reached the conclusion that the classification is
necessary, or narrowly tailored, to promote [the government’s compelling interest]”).
114. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 111, at 354.
115. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (dismissing racial prejudice as an
underlying motivation for the government action, and instead framing the issue as one requiring
immediate attention to the “real military dangers which were presented” by Japanese aggression).
116. Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
117. See Tussman & tenBrock, supra note 111, at 354.
118. Bell, supra note 87, at 524.
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equality for African-Americans will only be achieved if it serves the
interest of the white ruling class, it is debatable whether Justice
O’Connor’s interpretation of the equal protection clause119 in Grutter v.
Bollinger120 promotes racial equality for African-Americans. According
to Professor Bell, the Grutter race-based diversity opinion is a serious
distraction in the continuing efforts to attain equal racial justice for the
following four reasons.121 First, Professor Bell believes Grutter’s
rationale for diversity is bad public policy because it allows decision
makers to avoid confronting the real issues of race and class-based
discrimination that denies a student an equal opportunity to compete for
a college admission.122 Second, Professor Bell states that race-based
college diversity programs invite future litigation because there is no real
legal basis for approving diversity in college admissions while denying
race-based preferences in the areas of employment and public
contracts.123 Justice Scalia’s dissent correctly observes that there is no
principled basis for expanding the Grutter race-based diversity
discrimination rationale to public sector employment and other life
experiences.124 Third, Professor Bell emphasizes race-based diversity in
college bestows undeserved validity to traditional college admission
criteria that predominately favors affluent whites.125 Fourth, Professor
Bell declares the incredible attention given to race-based diversity in
college admission programs virtually repels any consideration of wealth
discrimination as a barrier to college admission.126
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
121. Bell, supra note 90.
122. Bell, supra note 90.
123. Bell, supra note 90.
124. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia, J., dissenting, with whom Thomas, J. joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scalia states:
If it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination
for the purpose of putting together a “critical mass” that will convey generic lessons in
socialization and good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate—indeed, particularly
appropriate—for the civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so. There, also,
those exposed to “critical masses” of certain races will presumably become better
Americans, better Michiganders, better civil servants. And surely private employers
cannot be criticized—indeed, should be praised—if they also “teach” good citizenship to
their adult employees through a patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in
hiring. The nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal education, a civil service
job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will surely understand.
Id.
125. Bell, supra note 90.
126. Bell, supra note 90. Bell states:
With government at every level struggling to manage huge deficits, many colleges are
suffering deep budget cuts that mean higher tuition and less money available for financial
aid. A Century Foundation study estimates that if the nation’s most selective colleges
abandoned affirmative action and looked only at grades and test scores, about 5,000
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Though Professor Bell’s position that at the end of the day the
Grutter opinion is bad public policy because it fails to aid in the fight
against racial injustice,127 the opinion also violates the spirit of the Brown
v. Board of Education128 decision because the Law School’s race-based
diversity classification “stamp[s] minorities with a badge of inferiority
and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that
they are ‘entitled to preferences.’”129 One of the goals of the equal
protection clause is to prohibit states from denying “any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”130 In theory, the equal
protection clause is supposed to be a personal right enjoyed by an
individual regardless of his or her racial group status because
“government may treat people differently because of their race only for
the most compelling reasons.”131 In contemporary America, when race is
articulated as an intangible factor in the higher education admission
process for an individual African-American, the merit of the individual
African-American’s application is lost or marginalized because of
presumed stereotypical perceptions that his or her racial group status was
the predominant factor in the admission process.132 Justice O’Connor’s
race-based diversity rationale is not understood as promoting equality for
African-Americans by a significant number of Americans because they
believe that diversity is simply a pretext for a racial preference.133
The irony of the Court’s race-based diversity holding in Grutter is

fewer black and Hispanic students would make the cut each year; but next year, officials
estimate that because of budget cuts at least 20,000 black and Hispanic students will be
shut out of California’s 108 community colleges. One can easily imagine the nationwide
attrition figures.
Bell, supra note 90, at 1632.
127. See id.
128. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
129. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J., joins as to Parts I-VII,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
132. See Thomas, Taylor, Rosenberg & Clift, supra note 19, available at 2003 WL 8639381.
“The [Grutter v. Bollinger] ruling does not really represent a consensus of popular opinion. Most
Americans say they favor ‘affirmative action’ and oppose ‘quotas’—both loaded terms. But asked
more neutrally whether they approve ‘racial preferences,’ the answer from both blacks and whites is
overwhelmingly no.” Id.
133. Id. The Newsweek article states:
O’Connor voted with five other justices to strike down the numerical system used to
admit Michigan undergraduates. Assigning a twenty-point bonus for skin color seemed to
smack of quotas. But O’Connor and four others voted to uphold the law school’s
admission system, which is less blatant but nonetheless affords a clear racial preference.
An African-American with a B-minus average in college has about the same chance of
admission to Michigan Law as a white or an Asian with an A average.
Id.
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that it may have breathed new life into the harmful message134 that
African-Americans are academically inferior135 and cannot compete at
elite colleges.136 Fifty years ago in Brown,137 the Supreme Court made it
clear that states were not to send any messages to students that they were
inferior in the education process because of their race. The real
foreseeable harm caused by African-Americans leaders insisting on racebased affirmative action is the harmful message of racial inferiority that
we are passing on to the next generation of African-Americans. William
Raspberry, a highly regarded African-American journalist, has also
expressed concern about whether race-based affirmative action sends a
message of racial inferiority to young African-Americans.138 Because
Mr. Raspberry is probably in denial about the harmful side effects of
race-based discrimination in the name of affirmative action, he will not
fully accept his own preliminary conclusion “that because their elders
and advocates insist on racial preferences as a policy far into the future,
our young people may be internalizing a sense of racial inferiority.”139

134. Cynthia Tucker, Defeating Prejudices of Critics, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), July 1,
2003, Three Star Edition, at MAIN A9, available at LEXIS, Major Newspaper, MAJPAP File. Ms.
Tucker states:
Occasionally, critics of affirmative action will try to persuade me to drop my support for
affirmative action programs, contending that such efforts taint me and other black
professionals with assumptions of incompetence. No matter how talented or
accomplished I may be, they say, some will always wonder whether I was given good
jobs simply because I’m black.
With the Supreme Court’s ruling last week backing affirmative action in college
admissions, that argument is once again making the rounds. Indeed, Justice Clarence
Thomas, who disagreed with the court’s majority, holds the view that affirmative action
taints its beneficiaries.
In his dissent, he quoted black abolitionist Frederick Douglass to make the point:
“And if the negro (sic) cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. . . . Let him
alone! . . . Your interference is doing him positive injury.”
Id.
135. Id. (“[S]uccessful blacks . . . have been subject to the slander of inferiority for the last
400 years, well before the term ‘affirmative action’ became part of the political lexicon.”)
136. Id. Less than a decade ago, two whites, Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, wrote an
845-page screed, “The Bell Curve,” arguing that blacks are intellectually inferior. Id.
137. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The Court in Brown stated:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Id.
138. William Raspberry, Editorial, Affirmative Approach, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2004 at A17,
available at 2004 WL 55829210.
139. Id. Raspberry relates the following:
I recently asked my black students at Duke University how long they thought racial
preference would be necessary. To my amazement, several of them answered, in essence,
“Forever.” What—perhaps over extrapolating from a tiny—sample could account for this
new pessimism? Two things, I suspect. First, we black Americans have changed our
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Some college students are using race-based affirmative action policies in
the higher education admission process at elite colleges to advance the
view that African-Americans are not paying their merit dues by receiving
special accommodation because of the diversity academic handout given
in the admission process to African-Americans in spite of their inferior
grades and substandard test scores.140 On September 24, 2003, Southern
Methodist University closed down a bake sale that sold cookies for
different prices based on the buyer’s race or gender.141 “The sign said
white males had to pay $1 for a cookie. White women: 75 cents.
Hispanics: 50 cents. Blacks: a quarter. The event Tuesday at Southern
Methodist University was no PTA bake sale.”142
The point of allowing an African-American to buy a cookie for onefourth of what a white has to pay for the same cookie is designed to send

measure of success. A quarter century ago, we looked to the achievable goal of a
substantial decrease in racial discrimination. Today, we look to the far more difficult goal
of eliminating racism. The second, though less certain in my own mind, is that because
their elders and advocates insist on racial preferences as a policy far into the future, our
young people may be internalizing a sense of inferiority. They respond by displacing the
responsibility for their shortcomings to the white dominated society. But the implication
is that [African-Americans] are permanently damaged goods, in permanent need of
special concessions.
Id.
140. Lynda K. Wertheimer, SMU Halts Race-Based Bake Sale; To Protest Affirmative Action,
Group Set Prices Using Ethnicity, Gender, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 2003, Second
Edition, at METRO 1B, available at LEXIS, Major Newspaper, MAJPAP File.
141. Id.
142. Id. Wetheimer reported that:
The Young Conservatives of Texas chapter ran its so-called affirmative action bake sale
to protest the use of race or gender as a factor in college admissions. Other groups have
held similar sales at colleges around the country since February.
. . .Matt Houston, a sophomore, said the group’s sign, which listed prices for the
treats according to the race and sex of buyers, was not a learning tool. It was offensive, he
said.
“My reaction was disgust because of the ignorance of some SMU students,” said
Mr. Houston, who is black. “They were arguing that affirmative action was solely based
on race. It’s not based on race. It’s based on bringing a diverse community to a certain
organization.”
He and Kambira Jones, a 20-year-old junior, both expressed their concerns to SMU
officials. “When I saw this, I was like, ‘I can’t believe they let you guys post this,’” she
said. “I felt they were attempting to make Hispanics and blacks feel inferior. We jumped
over the same hoops to get there.”
SMU’s freshman class this year is one of its most diverse ever – 20 percent of
students are minorities. Overall, minority enrollment among the school’s 10,000-member
student body is 19 percent.
Before the bake sale brouhaha, SMU already was planning a forum so students and
other could debate the aftermath of the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on affirmative
action. The court ruled in June that universities could use race as a factor in admissions
under limited conditions. The ruling changes the landscape in Texas, where universities
have been banned from using race as a factor since 1996.
Id.
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a message symbolizing the educational and economic inferiority of the
African-American group in higher education in a manner similar to the
way the separate but equal race-based laws were “usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the [African-American] group.”143 The cookie
sale on college campuses is designed to equate racial diversity with racial
inferiority in higher education for specific minorities while
simultaneously characterizing more affluent whites as the innocent
victims of reverse racial diversity discrimination.
While keeping one’s eyes on the value of the tainted racially
discriminatory diversity prize in higher education and its mixed message
of academic racial inferiority and token racial educational reparations
poorly disguised as racial diversity, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Grutter is further complicating the concept of evaluating AfricanAmerican educational advancement without offering a practical solution
free of race discrimination. Historically, “one of the most fiercely
contested issues in education”144 has been how to calculate AfricanAmerican progress.145
African-Americans supporting diversity in higher education based on
race are in denial about the general nature of many white Americans
toward African-Americans as a group. Based on traditional cultural
heritage, and economic and social dynamics, white Americans see
African-Americans as a group as presumptively possessing all of the
negative stereotypes associated with being black in America. Because
many whites view African-Americans as a group as inherently
143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
144. R. Scott Baker, The Paradoxes of Desegregation: Race, Class, and Education, 19351975, AM. J. EDUC., May 2001, at 321.
145. Id.
More than a century later, measuring African-American progress has become one of the
most fiercely contested issues in education. Surveying an educational landscape defined
by greater access for advantaged blacks and the continued isolation of most AfricanAmericans, scholars tend to emphasize one of these realities at the expense of the other.
Optimists argue that African-Americans have made dramatic and durable educational
progress. The most significant gains, David Tyack and Larry Cuban (1995) show, have
been fueled by the desegregation of schools, colleges, and universities. Drawing on a
generation of scholarship in sociology, Amy Stuart Wells and Robert Crain contend that
African-Americans who attend predominantly white educational institutions achieve
more and “are more likely to go on to college and secure high-status jobs” (Wells and
Crain 1997, p.1). Pessimists reject this portrait of unproblematic progress, arguing that
desegregation may well have done more harm than good. Vanessa Siddle Walker (2000)
contends that during the first half of the twentieth century African-Americans fashioned
educational environments that motivated students to excel and achieve their highest
potential. Harold Cruse (1987) and Derrick Bell (1992) assert that because these
nurturing educational environments were dismantled, desegregation failed to narrow
educational gaps or alter educational status of most blacks. Where optimists see progress
pessimists find regress.
Id.
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intellectually inferior to whites as a group it is educational suicide for
African-Americans as a group to endorse a race-based policy of
educational preference for blacks on the presumptive theory that AfricanAmericans are intellectually inferior because of either their grades or
scores on standardized tests. If reasonable African-Americans can accept
the theory that many whites engage in the presumption that AfricanAmericans as a group possess the stereotypical trait of being
intellectually inferior to whites, African-Americans should not be
shocked by the conclusion that many whites support race-based
affirmative action as a necessary evil to accommodate the presumed
intellectually inferior status of African-Americans.146
According to Professor Freedman, a journalism professor at
Columbia University, affluent parents created the affirmative action or
diversity concept to allow racial minorities to enter elite universities on a
separate but unequal admission standard because those minorities
admitted were presumed to be inferior.147 The conservative Justice
Thomas has also consistently tried to warn the African-American
community that race-based affirmative action programs like the one
established by the Law School classify African-Americans as inferior.148
Author Ellis Cose is a supporter of race-based affirmative action.149
Cose tells an eloquent story about the plight of a hypothetical brown boy
that suffered racial harassment because he was given a five-yard
advantage at the start of a race.150 Cose’s story makes the case against
race-based preferences for people who want to trade the long-term
harmful psychological message to their children of the racial inferiority
generally associated with race-based affirmative action for the immediate
benefit of a very small number of selected African-American race-based
affirmative action admittees.151 In Cose’s hypothetical, a brown
146. Samuel G. Freedman, ‘Legacy’ Admissions Ban Highlights Flaws in System, USA
TODAY, Jan. 22, 2004, at A15, available at 2004 WL58549864. Samuel Freedman is a professor of
journalism at Columbia University and has lately written, Jew vs. Jew: The Struggle for the Soul of
American Jewry. Freedman serves on the USA TODAY’s board of contributors. He has stated:
Affluent parents collectively have paid hundreds of millions of dollars to enroll their
children in test-prep classes, buying the appearance of merit. At the other end of the
process, college officials found themselves torn between the rhetoric of meritocracy and
the reality that blacks and Hispanics scored far below whites on standardized tests. So,
under the names of ‘affirmative action’ or ‘diversity,’ they cooked up a parallel
admissions track premised on pity, meaning minorities who entered their institutions did
so with the presumption of inferiority.
Id.
147. See id.
148. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2363-64 (2003) (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J.,
joins as to Parts I-VII, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class, 111-33 (Harper Perennial 1995).
150. See id. at 132-33.
151. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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unpopular child has a goal of becoming a runner.152 The brown child’s
peers decline to allow him to practice running on their track.153 One day a
track official observes the troubles of the brown boy and chooses to give
the boy an opportunity to run in the scheduled public races.154 The track
official states the other children are not required to let the brown boy
practice with them but they are required to the let the brown boy run in
the scheduled races.155 Because the brown boy was not allowed to
practice running with the other children the track official required the
other children to provide the brown boy with a five-yard head start.156
The story explains that:
Though the official has given a very public and heartfelt explanation
for the special treatment, loudmouths in the bleachers focus
increasingly on the unfairness of brown kid’s head start. Why is it
necessary? . . . Could he be genetically inferior? . . . Is something in his
culture keeping him from keeping up?157

Loving and caring parents in Cose’s hypothetical would not knowingly
subject the brown boy to such racial harassment and unnecessarily
assume the risk of creating an inferiority complex in the brown boy for a
temporary advantage at the expense of the brown boy’s self respect. The
African-American experience has demonstrated time and time again that
African-Americans have excelled and won the respect of others when
they have performed beyond the expectations of others in spite of racial
discrimination when given an opportunity to compete on an equal basis
of nondiscrimination. For example, in an age of tremendous racial
Thomas states:
It is uncontested that each year, the Law School admits a handful of blacks who would be
admitted in the absence of racial discrimination. See Brief for Respondents Bollinger et
al. 6. Who can differentiate between those who belong and those who do not? The
majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and because
of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This problem of stigma does not depend on
determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the “beneficiaries” of racial
discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry,
or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part in their
advancement. The question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination did
play a role, in which case the person may be deemed “otherwise unqualified,” or it did
not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would
succeed without discrimination.
Id.
152. Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class, 132-33 (Harper Perennial 1995).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 133.
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prejudice in the 1930s, an African-American sports hero Jesse Owens158
158. Mark Heisler, Atlanta 1996 / 50 Days To The Games Brothers in Sport Despite
Differences, Jesse Owens, Luz Long Struck up Friendship at 1936 Berlin Olympics, L.A. TIMES,
May 30,1996, available at 1996 WL 10506653. Heisler describes Owens’ achievements as follows:
The lessons of history, as Marge Schott reminds us, are soon forgotten. It’s been 60 years
since Jesse Owens’ performance at the Berlin Olympics, an event that now seems as
much a part of our national lore as the Pilgrims landing at Plymouth Rock, and as distant.
It began as a Nazi pageant and turned into a drama that seemed to presage the
American triumph in World War II Owens winning the 100 meters . . . Adolf Hitler
snubbing him . . . a German long jumper named Luz Long daring to openly befriend the
black American . . . Owens massing four gold medals in a powerful advertisement of the
glory of a free society.
“He just had that kind of carriage,” says Owens’ widow, Ruth, wistfully. “Look
how long he’s lasted. Jesse’s been dead for 16 years and he gets more publicity now than
a lot of athletes who are participating this year.
“Sometimes I have to just sit and tears come to my eyes when I think about it. You
say to yourself, ‘Well, gee, he had to be a heck of a fellow to last this long.’”
Owens was, indeed, special. He set an indoor sprint record that lasted 40 years. He set a
long jump record that lasted longer than Bob Beamon’s. But he was more than an athlete.
For a moment, Owens embodied the spirit of a rising young nation and the things he saw
and did will never be forgotten.
....
In the first place, the United States in 1936 was only “free” or “open” in a relative
sense.
American society was still widely segregated. The armed services wouldn’t be
integrated for 12 more years and until then there were quotas for black enlistees, who
were often steered away from combat. In segments of the country, blacks went to
“separate but equal” schools; the Supreme Court wouldn’t mandate integration for 18
more years.
....
Baker’s biography, “An American Life,” notes that just before Owens arrived in
1933, the NAACP had sued Ohio State, claiming that two black students had been denied
campus housing.
....
. . . Owens never lived in campus housing, boarding with other black students and,
after he and Ruth married, moving in with her cousin, Fannie.
Blacks could not eat in the restaurants along High Street, adjacent to the university, nor
attend the movie theaters. . . .
Owens, a prodigy, made the Olympic team in his junior year. There was growing
uneasiness among competing nations about the political overtones but if Jesse was
worried about it, he gave no sign.
....
“He was very young and he had to work very hard to make the Olympic team. I
don’t think Hitler or anything else could have kept him away. You know athletes, they
don’t see color. And he had been an athlete all his life.”
....
Nazi party newspapers predicted German Olympic victories that would confirm
Hitler’s race theory. The blacks on the American team were called “black auxiliaries.”
....
Owens won the 100 meters.
....
Owens won his second gold in the long jump.
....
Owens won his third gold medal in the 200 meters, then ran the leadoff leg of the
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did not need a five-yard advantage; he only needed an opportunity free of
race discrimination to compete as one athlete among equals.159 One can
only imagine Jesse Owens’s fate in the 1936 Olympics if he had asked
for a five-yard advantage in the 100 meters and the 200 meters events
because he was a victim of racial discrimination and “[t]he son of
sharecroppers and grandson of slaves.”160 All Americans should now be
grateful that Jesse Owens did not ask for a five-yard affirmative action
advantage at the 1936 Olympics in Hitler’s Germany.161 In 1936, I would
have rejected the argument that African-Americans are inferior athletes
and in 2004 I equally reject the contention that African Americans are
academically inferior.
The brown boy in Cose’s162 story should follow the lead of Jesse
Owens. Jesse Owens ran a good race in life without asking for a fiveyard advantage while living in a presumptive racist society in America.
Cose has placed his brown boy in a race with a five-yard race-based
advantage that the boy can only accept if he is willing to assume the risk
of losing confidence in himself and his self-respect.163 Unlike the brown
boy, Jesse Owens was never at risk of losing his self-respect because he
never received a five-yard advantaged America in 1936 that was
disrespectful to Jesse Owens by giving him “a ticker tape parade when he
returned to America but had to ride the freight elevator to a reception in
his honor at the Waldorf-Astoria.”164 Cose concludes that the brown boy
realizes that he will never win his race even with a five-yard start
400 –meter relay for the fourth. The Southern-born Wolfe, watching the 200 in the box of
the American ambassador, let out a loud whoop.
“Owens was black as tar,” Wolfe was later quoted by his biographer, Andrew
Turnbull, “but what the hell, it was our team and I thought he was wonderful.”
Id.
159. Gerald Tebben, Ohio MilePosts, Aug. 9, 1936; Jesse Owens Defeats The Nazis, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Aug. 9, 2003, at 3B, available at 2003 WL 59884554. Tebben states:
The son of sharecroppers and grandson of slaves, Jesse Owens was an Ohio State
University student in 1936 when he won a berth on the U.S. Olympic Team and a ticket
to Berlin. Adolf Hitler planned to make the Olympics a showplace of Aryan superiority.
When black athletes showed early signs of dominating some events, he retreated.
On the first morning of competition, Hitler received German and Finnish goldmedal winners in his private box to the roaring approval of the crowd. That afternoon,
U.S. black athlete Cornelius Johnson won the high jump. Before the national anthem
could be played, Hitler left the stadium. Aides said the departure had been prearranged.
The New York Times headlined it as a snub.
Id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class, 133 (Harper Perennial 1995).
163. Id.
164. Id. “When I came back to my native country, after all the stories about Hitler, I couldn’t
ride in the front of the bus,” Owens said. “I had to go to the back door. I couldn’t live where I
wanted.” Id.
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because of the hostile reaction of the crowd to him having the five-yard
advantage.165According to Cose, his brown boy “doesn’t know whether
he should ask for a bigger lead, give up the one he has, or simply
abandon the race.”166
What recommendations should be given to the little brown boy?
First, the little brown boy should not ask for a bigger lead because it will
only generate more hostility from the mob watching from an artificial
advantage.167 Second, the little brown boy should receive a brief black
history lesson and be told not to abandon his race in 2004 because Jesse
Owens did not abandon his race.168 Third, the little brown boy should
give up the false five-yard advantage at that elite track field because that
false advantage may serve as a pretext to destroy his confidence and selfrespect. Finally, the little brown boy needs to be taken by his hands to a
loving and caring coach. The coach’s job is to take the little brown boy
to good track fields that may not be elite but on those track fields he can
train free of racial discrimination to be the next Jesse Owens with honor
and respect for his African-American heritage.
VI. THE IMPLICATION OF RACE-NEUTRAL COLLEGE LEGACY
PREFERENCES FOR FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE CONTEXT OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
As a general rule, whites who openly oppose race discriminatory
affirmative action do not oppose race-neutral preferences. In the context
of higher education, legacy may be defined as an admissions label
utilized by the majority of private colleges and a number of public
universities for hopeful candidates who received a certain amount of
preferential treatment because family members previously attended the
school.169 Over the last three decades many thoughtful Americans have
considered college admissions as a rather simple offer. Many in the silent
majority believed that whites were admitted to colleges based on merit
because of their superior standardized test scores. One could be admitted
based on a racial preference if she is not white. For thirty years we were
led to believe that college admission decisions were either based on test
scores or skin color.170
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Tebben, supra note 159.
169. Danna Harman, Family Ties: An Unfair Advantage? Amid Debate over Racial
Preferences, Legacy Admissions are Suddenly Cast in a Harsher Light, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0206/p13s01-legn.html.
170. Id.
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The recent decision by Texas A&M University to discontinue
awarding race-neutral legacy preferences to the relatives of alumni has
introduced a needed dose of truth serum into the conversation about the
impact of preferences in college admissions.171 The Texas A&M family
legacy debate provides an opportunity to inform most Americans that
there are all sorts of unearned advantages in the admission process with
legacy status being one of the most common.172 According to one
commentator, the Texas A&M family legacy preference program raises
questions about our college admission system that is riddled with
cynicism and deceit.173
As a nation we have to ask whether the emphasis on supposed merit
in college admissions has been a lie, a failure, or both.174 A significant
number of whites are opposed to race-based preferences for AfricanAmericans in the higher educational arena because they equate racial
preferences with providing an opportunity for a specific racial minority
who did not measure up according to the accepted normal academic
standards.175 Whites opposing race-based reverse discrimination often
view race-based affirmative action as the road to career success for
unqualified African-Americans.176
However, many whites that support race-based affirmative action
also support race-neutral legacy affirmative action based on family

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Freedman, supra note 146.
174. Freedman, supra note 146.
175. Will, supra note 100.
176. Cose, supra note 149, at 111. Cose states:
When the talk turns to affirmative action, I often recall a conversation from years ago. A
young white man, a Harvard student and the brother of a close friend, happened to be in
Washington when the Supreme Court ruled on an affirmative action question. I have long
since forgotten the question and the Court’s decision, but I remember the young man’s
reaction.
He was not only troubled but choleric at the very notion that “unqualified
minorities” would dare to demand preferential treatment. Why, he wanted to know,
couldn’t they compete like everyone else? Why should hardworking whites like himself
be pushed aside for second-rate affirmative action hires? Why should he be discriminated
against in order to accommodate them? His tirade went on for quite a while, and he
became more indignant by the second as he conjured up one injustice after another.
When the young man paused to catch his breath, I took the occasion to observe that
it seemed more than a bit hypocritical of him to rage on about preferential treatment. A
person of modest intellect, he had gotten into Harvard largely on the basis of family
connections. His first summer internship, with the White House, had been arranged by a
family member. His second, with the World Bank, had been similarly arranged. Thanks
to his nice internship and Harvard degree, he had been promised a coveted slot in a major
company’s executive training program. In short, he was already well on his way to a
distinguished career—a career made possible by preferential treatment.
Cose, supra note 149, at 111 (emphasis in original).
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ties.177 Race-neutral reverse affirmative action is “a practice as old as
colleges themselves, and is intended to boost alumni support and
donations and foster a sense of community.”178 Senator John Edwards,
the Democratic vice presidential candidate, has repeatedly criticized
legacies as an aristocratic birthright that is not consistent with American
democracy and he argues that the legacy practice should be prohibited.179
After the 2003 Grutter decision giving limited approval to raceconscious affirmative-action admissions, lawmakers are now beginning
to evaluate whether legacy is a form of “reverse affirmative action,
which gives an edge to those whose parents and grandparents went to
selective colleges at a time when most minorities there were few and far
between.”180 Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts has been
classified as a member of the Harvard legacy181 and is not a champion of
the legacy practice.182 Kennedy has proposed federal legislation
commanding colleges to reveal the race and economic rank of first-year
students with family ties to alumni.183 The Massachusetts Senator
anticipates that his legacy disclosure law “would force colleges to reveal
how the preferences disproportionately benefit affluent white students,
and might embarrass them into limiting such preferences on their
own.”184
Race-neutral legacies should not automatically be ended as a form of

177. Danna Harman, Family Ties: An Unfair Advantage? Amid Debate over Racial
Preferences, Legacy Admissions are Suddenly Cast in a Harsher Light, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0206/p13s01-legn.html.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. Harman explains that:
Then, last month, Texas A&M University, under pressure to review its legacy policies
after it dropped its affirmative-action program, announced that the school would not wait
for a law to tell it what to do - and abolished the practice, fueling the debate even further.
....
Texas A&M’s legacy policy is far from unique. Amherst College in Massachusetts,
for example, accepts nearly half of alumni children who apply, compared with 17 percent
of all applicants. Sons and daughters of alumni make up more than 10 percent of students
at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton and a whopping 23 percent at Notre Dame. While legacy
students are becoming more diverse, reflecting the surge in minority enrollment in the
1970s, whites still make up the vast majority. At Harvard last year, only 7.6 percent of
legacy applicants accepted were black, Hispanic or Native American, compared with 17.8
percent of all successful applicants.
But, far from following A&M’s lead, most universities across the country are
chafing at the idea of additional restrictions on their admissions policies and speaking out
against the Kennedy bill.
Id.
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reverse discrimination favoring whites. The traditional legacy concept
should be expanded to include nontraditional students on a basis that
does not include race-based discrimination. For example, those with
family ties to economic disadvantaged athletes could be awarded “super
legacy points.” Family members of former college athletes who played in
sports that generate super profits for the college should be entitled to
super legacy points.185 Those colleges and universities with an
established tradition of awarding legacy points may find other creative
ways to give super legacy points free of practicing race discrimination to
relatives of athletes. At Penn, the legacy practice is taken seriously; at
Michigan, a legacy status will earn you extra points; Harvard admits that
the legacy issue is not ignored; and Notre Dame concedes that it is very
legacy friendly.186 If Penn, Michigan, Harvard, and Notre Dame
announced that they were awarding super legacy points to family
members of former athletes who entered their respective schools as
economically disadvantaged, others might follow their lead. Duke
University Provost Peter Lange contends that establishing alumni loyalty
with a legacy admissions policy helps universities to fund plans that
increase racial diversity.187
By awarding super legacy points to the relatives of economically
disadvantaged athletes, colleges with a traditional legacy program will
simply be creating one more athletic-related exception to the concept of
true merit criteria in the admission process.188 One who rejects the
advocacy of super legacy points for economically disadvantaged athletes
as lacking academic merit based on standardized test scores and grades
might warm up to super legacy points because such an advocate of “true
meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by
numerous exceptions to “merit”189 based on test scores and grades.
According to Justice Thomas, the national debate about the use of racial
preferences in higher education reveals that elite colleges and
universities use “‘legacy’ preferences to give the children of alumni an

185. Julia Silverman, College Spending on Sports Under Fire, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 10,
2004, available at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040210/ap_on_sp_co
_ne/fbc_spending_on_sports_1. The Silverman article states:
Supporters of college athletics . . . [argue] that college sports are big business, like it or
not. Moneymaking sports like men’s football and basketball often underwrite other
college athletic teams, from squash to soccer. And universities say fancy stadiums, arenas
and locker rooms help them recruit star athletes and attract fans and donors.
Id.
186. Harman, supra note 169.
187. Harman, supra note 169.
188. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2359 (2003) (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J.,
joins as to Parts I-VII, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id.
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advantage in admissions.”190 Justice Thomas identified legacy preference
as one type of exception to “true” meritocracy that allows him to
conclude that merit admissions are “not the order of the day at the
nation’s universities.”191 Justice Thomas appears not to endorse legacy
preferences because he describes them as “unseemly.”192
Although Justice Thomas suggests that legacies are not appropriate,
he said, “I will not twist the Constitution to invalidate legacy
preferences.”193 In an ideal world, the concept of legacy preferences
might not be preferred, but legacy preferences that include a preference
for relatives of disadvantaged athletes because the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the traditional race-neutral legacy program.194
The Equal Protection Clause would only prohibit an arbitrary legacy
admission preference program that treated similar situated legacies
differently because the lack of any conceivable reasonable state interest
would violate equal protection principles under the Court’s rationale
articulated in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.195
VII. WHITES-ONLY SCHOLARSHIP IS AN UNFORTUNATE FORESEEABLE
CONSEQUENCE OF RACE EXCLUSIVE SCHOLARSHIP FOR THE BENEFIT OF
OTHER RACIAL GROUPS
As a southern African-American male and native of Mississippi, I
disapprove of all state sponsored race-based discrimination. I am not at
all surprised that some white students dislike reverse discrimination by
the government when they are asked to bear the burden of race
discrimination in the name of diversity. For example, students at Roger
Williams University are proposing a scholarship for only white
students.196 The students contend that the whites-only scholarship is
intended to protest race-based affirmative action in higher education.197
“Jason Mattera, 20, who is president of the College Republicans, said the
group is parodying minority scholarships. ‘White kids are at a handicap,’
Mattera told the Providence Journal. ‘Handing out scholarships based on
someone’s color is absurd.’”198 Mattera has Puerto Rican ancestry and is
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2360.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
196. Student Group Offers Whites-Only Scholarship, AP, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2004, at A7,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44488-2004Feb15.html.
197. Id.
198. Id. “The application for the $250 award requires an essay on ‘why you are proud of your
white heritage’ and a recent picture to ‘confirm whiteness.’ ‘Evidence of bleaching will disqualify
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the beneficiary of a $5,000 scholarship available for minority students.199
“No matter what my ethnicity is, I’m making a statement that
scholarships should be given out based on merit and need,” he said.200
Affirmative action scholarships based on criteria that do not include
racial discrimination are favorable. Unlike Julian Bonds, the Chairman of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
goal of affirmative action is not “about removing the preferences that
white people have enjoyed for centuries.”201 Affirmative action should
expand the preferences traditionally enjoyed by whites to include
African-Americans and other historically disadvantaged groups based on
criteria free of racial discrimination. Historically, white colleges with
elite college sports programs have been successful in recruiting AfricanAmerican athletes on a race-neutral basis to serve on their moneymaking sports teams. If historically white colleges can succeed in
recruiting minority athletes on a race-neutral basis, America’s elite
colleges can also succeed in recruiting non-athlete African-American
college students to their college campuses on a race-neutral basis if they
act in good faith. Though Julian Bonds is misguided about the goal of
race-based affirmative action, Bonds is correct in the view that “it has
been only a short 39 years that all black Americans have exercised the
full rights of citizens, only 39 years since legal segregation was ended
nationwide, only 39 years since the right to register to vote was
universally guaranteed.”202 It is clearly implausible to conclude “those 39
years have been enough”203 to overcome the historical vestiges of racial
slavery. But the remedy for racial slavery and racial discrimination is to

applicants,’ says the application, issued by the university’s College Republicans.” Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Clarke Morrison, Civil Rights Pioneer Bond: ‘Righteous War’ Must Continue; NAACP
Chairman Defends Affirmative Action During UNCA Speech, ASHVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES (NC), Feb.
7, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 60195897.
202. Id.
203. Id. Clarke Morrison states:
“American slavery was a human horror of staggering dimensions,” Bond said. “The
profits it produced endowed great fortunes and enriched generations.” Centuries of
slavery were followed by 100 years of state sanctioned discrimination, reinforced by
public and private terror, ending only after a protracted struggle in 1965.”
When the 20th century began, black people were slaves in every way but legally, he
said. Most couldn’t vote and attended inadequate, segregated schools. Few owned the
land they farmed or the homes they lived in.
The landmark Brown v. Board of Education court decision in 1954 outlawing racial
discrimination in public schools was the civil rights movement’s “greatest legal victory
. . . the quest for meaningful equality had begun.” The ruling gave license to common
people to declare segregation immoral and made passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964
possible, which was “democracy’s finest hour.”
Id.
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pursue a course of nondiscrimination coupled with a pragmatic plan to
bridge the economic and education gap between America’s historically
disadvantaged citizens.
The inherent danger in requesting scholarship for historically
disadvantaged African-American students based on race is that it allows
some members of the historically advantaged white group, or a
representative of the group, to characterize whites as the new victims of
reverse invidious discrimination.204 “[I]t is white students today who are
feeling the backlash of discrimination wielded against them by
scholarships for non-whites,”205 according to Mattera. Whites who may
have been embarrassed to articulate the need for a whites-only
scholarship before Grutter v. Bollinger in a post-Grutter world have been
given ammunition to declare the white group currently disadvantaged by
race preferences.206 Although commentator Clarence Page is correct in
saying there is nothing new about whites-only scholarships, he misses
the point that the new rationale for whites-only scholarships is to
symbolize the need to protect whites from the backlash of reverse racial
discrimination.207 Although some would treat the whites-only
scholarships as a joke,208 Americans should decline to treat any racebased discrimination by one group of Americans against another group
as a laughing matter and should look forward to the day when America
will say “no” to all race exclusive scholarships.209 That is not to say that
there should be opposition for scholarships based on reasonable
preferences that do not include race, scholarships for the poor, and
scholarships for athletes, band members, hard working students with
reasonable grades, and for left-handed students. There are so many raceneutral ways to grant scholarship and admission preferences to

204. Clarence Page, There’s Nothing New about Whites-Only Scholarship, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Feb. 18, 2004, available at 2004 WL 69248720.
205. Id.
206. Id. Clarence Page relates the following about Mattera:
“We think that, if you want to treat someone according to character and how well they
achieve academically, then skin color shouldn’t really be an option,” [Mattera] told the
Journal.
Yet, Mattera, who is of Puerto Rican descent, is himself a recipient of a $5,000
Sallie Mae Fund scholarship for Hispanic students.
How does he square accepting a scholarship for non-whites with his opposition to
preferential treatment for non-whites. Well, Mattera apparently believes the myth that
only unqualified people benefit from affirmative action. He told CNN’s Daryn Kagan, for
example, that his Hispanics-only scholarship was OK because he earned it with his
excellent grade point average, not “just because I’m Puerto Rican.”
Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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students210 that only an instigator of reverse racial preferences would find
race to be a necessary factor in the decision making process. The Rhode
Island Republican Party correctly disapproves of the whites-only
scholarship because of its racist overtones.211 However, all race exclusive
scholarships and admission practices should be condemned because of
their racist connotations.212

210. Id. Clarence Page describes the following scholarships:
Take a look at just a few of the other groups that FinAid.com found receive preferences
under currently available scholarships simply as a consequence of their condition of birth:
Left-handed students: The Frederick and Mary F. Beckley Scholarship will award
up to $1,000 to attending Juniata College, Huntingdon, Pa.
Little people: The Little People of America association offers for its members, who
must be 4-foot-10 or less in height.
Tall people: Tall Clubs International offers a $1,000 scholarship to women who are
at least 5-foot-10 and men who are at least 6-foot-2, presumably in their stocking feet.
Just-average people: The David Letterman Scholarship, established by the latenight TV star, awards scholarships to telecommunications students at his alma mater, Ball
State University, who are “average students who nevertheless have a creative mind.”
Catholics named Zolp: The aptly-named Zolp Scholarship offers full tuition for four
years at Loyola University in Chicago for Catholic students whose last name happens to
be Zolp, as documented by their birth certificate and confirmation certificate. First-name
Zolps need not apply.
Anyone named Scarpinato: Full attendance at Texas A&M University is available
for anyone whose last name is Scarpinato—by birth or by marriage, so you still have a
chance to marry into this scholarship.
Descendants of alumni: There are lots of these, of course, but one of the more
unusual enables selected incoming freshmen at Hood College in Frederick, Md., the
opportunity to pay the same first year tuition as their alumnus parent or grandparent.
Without inflation.
Twins and triplets: Lots of these too. But one of the more unusual is offered by
Lake Erie College in Painesville, Ohio, where each twin gets the scholarship in alternate
years.
Id.
211. Jennifer Styles, Whites-Only Scholarship Generates Controversy, Feb. 18, 2004,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/EDUCATION/02/18/whites.only.scholars/index.html. Styles
reported the following:
“It all began two weeks ago as a way for the college Republican groups to express their
opposition and tell people they are against race-based scholarships and affirmative
action,” June Speakman, faculty adviser for the College Republicans told CNN.
“We never expected such an overwhelming response of e-mails and media
attention.”
The scholarship is for $250, but College Republicans president Jason Mattera said
he has received donations and pledges totaling $4,000 for future whites-only
scholarships.
Id.
212. L. Darnell Weeden, Just Say No to Race Exclusive Scholarships: From an Afrocentric
Perspective, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1995).
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VIII. THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR AN EQUITABLE PUBLIC POLICY THAT
NARROWS THE EDUCATION ACHIEVEMENT GAPS BETWEEN
HISTORICALLY DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND MIDDLE CLASS NONMINORITY STUDENTS
Those committed to finding appropriate means for better educating
the masses of African-American children should not be afraid to
reconsider long-held views about the effectiveness of race-based
affirmative action and racial discrimination as opposed to
nondiscrimination coupled with a policy of economic equity in education
for historically disadvantaged children. On Tuesday February 17, 2004,
Professor John Brittain, my colleague at Texas Southern University, “one
of the country’s prominent civil rights lawyers and integrationists
dropped a bombshell”213 by announcing “he is considering abandoning
his advocacy of integrated public schools.”214 Brittain now suggests the
focus for quality education for minority school children should consider
devoting scarce resources in neighborhood schools while making the
case for affordable housing in communities located in the suburbs.215
Professor Brittain may be reconsidering his life-long commitment to
school integration as the primary tool for providing African-Americans
with a quality education. Fifty years after the Brown v. Board of
Education decision made segregation by law illegal, the objective
evidence from a current Harvard study216 indicates that the Brown
decision has not been very successful in ending school segregation and
inferior education for a majority of African-American children. Fifty
years after the Supreme Court outlawed school segregation; a
contemporary Harvard University study concludes “that America’s
public schools are re-segregating at a pace that brings us back to the
1960s. And while the academic achievement gap between white and
minority students began to narrow in the 1980s, it is widening again.”217
213. Stan Simpson, An Advocate of Integration Reconsiders, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb 18,
2004, available at http://www.freespeech.com/archives/002004.html.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. Stan Simpson reports:
John Brittain, the former lead plaintiff’s attorney in Connecticut’s historic Sheff vs.
O’Neill desegregation lawsuit, said . . .
....
“The resources, time, money and effort such as we put into Sheff vs. O’Neill, we
should really invest in trying to improve educational achievement even in all one-race,
non-white schools. . . . We’ve almost come back to Plessy vs. Ferguson. Separate, and
trying to make it equal.”
Wow! Quite a turnaround for a guy who for most of his career insisted that a quality
education begins with an integrated classroom.
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During a February 2004 forum analyzing the Brown decision,
Richard L. Schwab, the University of Connecticut Dean of Education,
presented research showing that the National Assessment of Educational
Progress has determined “that the average African-American and Latino
17-year-old has the equivalent education of a 13-year-old white kid in
math and reading.”218 As we attempt to close the educational
achievement gap between white, African-American, and Latino students,
we must seriously consider the economic affirmative action remedy of
equitable school financing for all students regardless of the property
value in their economically inferior urban neighborhood or rural
community.219 A level playing field for all of America’s school children
demands economic affirmative action to reform school financing to
insure all American children have an equitable education that is at least
competitive with that of the average middle class white school child in
the affected state.220
....
. . . [Britain] still values integration and is by no means promoting separatism. He’s
simply saying that the lack of progress in public school integration in the past 50 years is
giving him pause.
Id.
218. Id.
219. Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy Debate: Implications For
Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 134 (2003). Shavers states:
Nearly fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court issued its decision in Brown, yet
many children continue to be deprived of an equal education opportunity. . . . In this
effort to receive an equal education opportunity for students who have been deprived of
that right, lawsuits have been commenced in all but 5 of the 50 states. These challenges
on the basis of a denial of equal education opportunity to students in the state have moved
from a focus on racial discrimination, to the state-created finance formulas that determine
how much each school district has to spend on education. Traditionally, the funding
formula that provides basic state aid to school districts consists primarily of property
taxes imposed at the local level.
Id. (citation omitted).
220. See id. Shavers explains:
The amount available for per-pupil expenditure generally depends upon two main
components: (1) the amount contributed to each school district from the state collected
revenue and (2) the amount generated from taxable real estate in the local school district.
The claim in school finance litigation has been that equalization of educational
opportunities requires the establishment of a financing system that does not directly link a
district’s per pupil expenditure to its taxable wealth. While in response to claims of denial
of equal education opportunity, the states could demonstrate that they had not
deliberately configured school districts to maintain racially separate schools and schools
that were noticeably inferior if attended by minority students, challengers asserted they
could demonstrate that states created financing systems that resulted in an inferior
education to students in districts that had less real property wealth than those with more
real property wealth. Often the argument was that minority children resided in the
property poor districts. The references here to school finance concern education revenue
and payments for instruction, support services, and other activities for kindergarten
through high school (K-12). This includes the operation of public schools, teachers’
salaries, construction of school buildings, the purchase and operation of school buses, and
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While campaigning for the Democratic Presidential nomination,
Senator John Edwards of North Carolina described “2 Public School
Systems” in America as wrong.221 According to Senator Edwards,
America has “two public school systems, one for the haves and one for
everybody else.”222 Public schools in poor communities do not perform
as well as those in rich communities.223 At least one commentator
believes that “Mr. Edwards has won praise for sticking so doggedly to
his standard theme of two Americas divided by class.”224
Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter v. Bollinger that “the use of
racial preferences” to support racial diversity in higher education will no
longer be necessary in twenty-five years225 is a pipe dream unless
America is willing to equitably finance a top quality public education
system for all of its children including those in the educational diversity
pipeline from pre-kindergarten thru high school. Race-based affirmative
action will still be necessary under Justice O’Connor’s rationale226 if
America continues its current two public schools systems for the affluent
and financially disadvantaged because the students in the under-funded,
predominately poor and minority school pipeline will still not be
competitive with those who have attended elite public schools from prekindergarten until high school graduation.
Professor Suzanne E. Eckes has taken the position that the Grutter
rationale that diversity is a compelling state interest for purposes of racebased college admissions should apply to K-12 educational admission
programs.227 Applying the race-based diversity admission program to K12 students is not likely to promote an end to the race-based admission
programs at the college level in the year 2028. Substituting race-based
classifications that are not compelling is a poor substitute for a rational,
adequately funded program, free of racial discrimination designed to
other services.
Claims of lack of equity developed around the theory that all districts should
receive a relatively equal level of resources, based on relative need. The need for, and
complexities of, school finance reform has been considered by numerous scholars,
advocates and economists.
Id. at 134-35.
221. Jim Rutenberg, The AD Campaign : Edwards Highlights His Theme of Two Americas,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/27/ politics/campaign/
27ADBO.html?n=Top%2fNews%2fWashington%2fCampaign%202004%2fCandidates%2fJohn%2
0Edwards.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
226. Id.
227. Suzanne E. Eckes, How Will the Grutter and Gratz Affirmative Action Decisions Impact
K-12 Diversity Plans?, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2003).
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insure a quality education for all of America’s children. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent correctly and appropriately accused the Court in
Grutter of reciting the strict scrutiny analysis for race-based
classifications, but failing to apply strict scrutiny because the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the means actually used by law schools.228
Justice Kennedy is absolutely correct in concluding that the Court simply
fails to apply the strict scrutiny standard. “By trying to say otherwise, it
undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents.”229
Anyone serious about ending race-based affirmative action under the
Court’s Grutter rationale must address social issues far broader than
equity in financing public schools so as to create competitive educational
opportunities for all students.230 To make Justice O’ Connor’s dream of
ending race-based affirmative action for college admission a reality by
the year 2028, Lisbeth B. Schorr estimates “that it would cost between
$110 billion and $125 billion a year” if one excludes the cost of universal
health care.231 Schorr believes that it is necessary to have universal health
care if race-based affirmative action discrimination is to end in 25
years.232 Schorr refers to Justice O’Connor’s goal of ending the need for
race-based affirmative action in colleges in 25 years as the O’ Connor
project.233 Schorr properly concludes that America can end racial
discrimination in affirmative action with an effective race-neutral policy
for ending racial disparities if it is willing to invest the financial
resources necessary to eliminate racial disparities at critical stages in a
person’s life.234
228. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2366, 2370 (Rehnquist, C J., dissenting) (with whom Scalia, J.,
Kennedy, J., Thomas, J. join dissenting).
229. Id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy states:
The Court, in a review that is nothing short of perfunctory, accepts the University of
Michigan Law School’s assurances that its admissions process meets with constitutional
requirements. The majority fails to confront the reality of how the Law School’s
admissions policy is implemented. The dissenting opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
which I join in full, demonstrates beyond question why the concept of critical mass is a
delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in
most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas. An effort to
achieve racial balance among the minorities the school seeks to attract is, by the Court’s
own admission, “patently unconstitutional.” Ante, at 2339; see also Bakke, 438 U.S., at
307, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.). It remains to point out how critical mass
becomes inconsistent with individual consideration in some more specific aspects of the
admissions process.
Id. at 2371.
230. William Raspberry, Editorial, Affirmative Approach, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2004 at A17,
available at 2004 WL 55829210.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Lisbeth B. Schorr, The O’Connor Project, 15 AM. PROSPECT 30, Jan, 1, 2004, available
at 2004 WL 63582826.
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Schorr identifies five concrete proposals that will make race
preferences in higher education unnecessary in twenty-five years.
According to Schorr, the O’Connor project for eliminating racial
preferences as a method of achieving diversity requires eliminating racial
disparities in the following five situations:235 (1) in birth outcomes; (2) in
school readiness; (3) in the opportunities provided at the elementary,
middle, and high school levels; (4) in the chance for teenagers to make a
proper changeover to the responsibility of being a young man or woman;
(5) in the abilities that families have to provide their children with a solid
foundation in life.236 Schorr states:
To bring the nation’s actions in line with our best intentions, in just the
ways that Justice O’Connor’s decision implies, requires action on an
agenda that is coherent, bold and difficult. But don’t let anybody tell
you that it can’t be done or that we don’t know how to do it.237

Schorr is right to suggest America knows how to develop a race-neutral
agenda to make race discrimination unnecessary.238 Schorr believes
America could follow a model used in Great Britain in making racebased affirmative action unnecessary for minorities to achieve a
competitive education.239
Justice Ginsburg’s and Breyer’s comments in Grutter v. Bollinger
entail the suggestion that rank racial discrimination in this nation impairs
235. Id.
236. Id. Schorr states:
THE LEADERSHIP AND THE FINANCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL resources for
such an ambitious undertaking as the O’Connor Project would have to come from a broad
partnership, including government and public officials at all levels, philanthropy, the
professional and academic communities, and the local groups throughout the country that
are already working to make their communities a better place to live.
While we seek a wide base of support for committing the necessary resources, one model
we could look to as a way to begin is the one now flourishing in Great Britain. When
Prime Minister Tony Blair took office, the long-standing gap between the least and most
advantaged populations was continuing to increase. He committed his government to
eliminating poverty among children, to radically reducing income-based health
disparities, and to narrowing the gap between deprived neighborhoods and the rest of the
country all within 20 years. Funding from both government and philanthropy has
mobilized an extraordinary array of Britain’s most daring and able individuals into the
service of achieving these objectives. In the United States today, the challenge to
embrace similarly lofty aspirations may seem particularly daunting, and even unrealistic.
At a time of philanthropic retrenchment and fierce cuts in federal, state and local humanservice budgets, how can the American public be expected to support an agenda as bold
as the O’Connor Project contemplates?
Id.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. Id.
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the ability of America to adequately prepare African-American children
in the pipeline with a competitive white middle class education for
purposes of college admission.240 Rank racism is still alive and well in
America and one cannot cure that racism by invoking offensive and
divisive race-based preferences in the college admission process.241
Rather than engage in a temporary race-based admission formula as
articulated by the Court in Grutter, the Court should have challenged the
nation to adopt a comprehensive plan similar to the one outlined by
Schorr.242 I shall “firmly forecast”243 that unless this nation commits the
appropriate financial resources to neutralize the continuing effects of
racial discrimination, Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer only
hope in vain that over the next generation race-based affirmative action
will not be necessary.244
Unless a comprehensive plan that addresses the social and economic
gaps that exist between whites and other historically disadvantaged racial
minorities in those five situations identified by Schorr,245 Justice
Thomas’s conclusion that the majority’s twenty-five-year time
limitations for race-based preferences will prove to have been based on
mere speculation rather than objective evidence will become a selfevident prophecy.246 In the absence of funding to implement a
comprehensive plan addressing Schorr’s racial disparity gaps, one may
conclude that Justice Thomas has reasonably predicted that “the gaps in
credentials between black and white students”247 will not disappear in
twenty-five years.248
IX. CONCLUSION
I object to racially discriminatory governmental action because
neither the local, state, nor national government has the ability to
discriminate against an individual or any group fairly based on race.
Race-based discrimination should not serve as a predominant factor in
240. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347-48 (2003) (Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).
241. Id.
242. Schorr, supra note 234.
243. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348 (Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., concurring).
244. Id.
245. Schorr, supra note 234.
246. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2363-64 (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J., joins as to Parts I-VII,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Id. at 2364.
248. Id. “No one can seriously contend, and the Court does not, that the racial gap in academic
credentials will disappear in 25 years. Nor is the Court’s holding that racial discrimination will be
unconstitutional in 25 years made contingent on the gap closing in that time.” Id.
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the American political and legal psyche.249 Professors Joseph Tussman
and Jacbous tenBroek correctly recommended in 1949 that all courts
including the Supreme Court deal with race as one of those “traits which
can never be made the basis of a constitutional classification.”250 As we
keep our eyes on the racially-tainted diversity prize in law school
admissions, Americans must never forget that in America, when the law
classifies on the basis of race, we all lose. All Americans are defeated by
race-based classifications because the predominant rationale for their use
in America has been to either promote the natural superiority of whites or
to promote the inborn inferiority of America’s former black slaves.
Brown University has made a decision to examine its historical
relationship with America’s slave trade.251 One commentator declares
that America has a legacy of an anti-Black reaction.252 If the legacy of
Grutter v. Bollinger proves to be that race-based diversity was deemed
necessary by elite colleges because African-Americans are deemed to be
inherently intellectually inferior to whites, the Grutter decision simply
renews the debate about whether America continues to be an anti-Black
society.253 America’s debate about using the race of African-Americans
in making decisions about college admissions only highlights the need
for America to search for an appropriate and equitable means to move
249. L. Darnell Weeden, Affirmative Action California Style─Proposition 209: The Right
Message While Avoiding A Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because Of Race And Sex, 21 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 281, 286 (1997).
Given America’s history with race-based classification schemes, it is not reasonable to
believe that America can justify a race-based benefit or burden that does not violate the
natural equality of all human beings. There was a natural law of equality before the
legislature began to place artificial labels on groups of people to further governmental
notions of racial superiority and official racial suppression of that class of people deemed
to be of an inferior race.
Id.
250. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 111, at 354.
251. Pam Belluck, Brown University to Examine Debt to Slave Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/13/education/13BROW.html?th. Belluck
reports:
When Ruth J. Simmons became the president of Brown University nearly three years
ago, one striking fact could not be overlooked.
A great-granddaughter of slaves, Dr. Simmons was the first African-American
president of an Ivy League university. But the 240-year-old university she was chosen to
lead had early links to slavery, with major benefactors and officers of it having owned
and traded slaves.
....
Now, Dr. Simmons, whose office is in a building constructed by laborers who
included slaves, has directed Brown to start what its officials say is an unprecedented
undertaking for a university: an exploration of reparations for slavery and specifically
whether Brown should pay reparations or otherwise make amends for its past.
Id.
252. Wallace, supra note 15, at 697.
253. See Wallace, supra note 15, at 697.
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beyond its history of legalized racial slavery and de jure racial
discrimination.254 Brown University’s brave decision to revisit the issue
of race-based slavery will hopefully help America close the economic
disparities between some of the descendents of its former slaves based on
a social justice program free of racial discrimination.255
A number of the descendents of America’s former slaves need
economic justice not because of their race, but because of their inferior
economic status. Several of the descendents of former slaves need
economic justice because, but for the forced slavery of their ancestors, it
is fair to presume that they would have achieved an economic status
similar to the average white middle class person. On the other hand, one
may presume that African-Americans who have economic status and
education experiences similar to the average white middle class person
may not be entitled to an individual economic justice remedy because it
is fair to assume that the continuing effects of slavery are not the
proximate cause of his or her failure to be competitive in the educational
arena. Affirmative action or diversity in education for AfricanAmericans, or any other American, should be premised on the concept of
economic justice, free of race discrimination after taking into account
that person’s current individual status, as well as any historical economic
disadvantage associated with one’s group status that is similar to slavery
or involuntarily servitude.256

254. See Belluck, supra note 251. Belluck reports Dr. Simmons of Brown University stated:
“How does one repair a kind of social breach in human rights so that people are not just
coming back to it periodically and demanding apologies,” she said, “so that society learns
from it, acknowledges what has taken place and then moves on. What I’m trying to do,
you see, in a country that wants to move on, I’m trying to understand as a descendant of
slaves how to feel good about moving on.”
Belluck, supra note 251.
255. Belluck, supra note 251.
256. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall
exist within the United States.”

